Buyer-Supplier and Supplier-Supplier Alliances: Do They Reinforce or Undermine One Another? by Lazzarini, Sergio G. et al.
Buyer-Supplier and 
Supplier-Supplier Alliances: 






WPE: 091/2007Copyright Insper. Todos os direitos reservados.
É proibida a reprodução parcial ou integral do conteúdo deste 
documento por qualquer meio de distribuição, digital ou im-
presso, sem a expressa autorização do
Insper ou de seu autor.
A reprodução para fins didáticos é permitida observando-sea 
citação completa do documento  1
Buyer-Supplier and Supplier-Supplier Alliances: Do They Reinforce or 
Undermine One Another?* 
 
Sergio G. Lazzarini 
Ibmec São Paulo 
Danny Pimentel Claro 
Ibmec São Paulo 
 
Luiz F. Mesquita 
Arizona State University 
 
Abstract 
Research has emphasized the emergence of buyer-supplier (vertical) and supplier-supplier (horizontal) 
alliances as a way to foster inter-organizational learning and cooperative efforts in production systems.  
There is some controversy, however, regarding how those distinct alliances interact with each other.  Some 
propose that supplier-supplier alliances reinforce the development of buyer-supplier alliances, or vice-
versa.  For instance, the inter-organizational learning that occurs at the horizontal level generates positive 
spillovers to the vertical alliance.  Others propose instead a negative interplay: when crafting vertical 
alliances, for instance, buyers may inhibit the formation of horizontal alliances as a way to preserve their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers.  We empirically test those competing views using survey data from 
the Brazilian auto-parts industry.  In an attempt at reconciliation, we additionally propose that the 
interaction between buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances will be positive or negative depending 
on a particular contingency: the extent to which supply components are subject to uncertain technological 
change.  Our data reveal that the existence of vertical alliances inhibits the development of horizontal 
alliances, but only when technological uncertainty is relatively low.  When components are subject to 
higher technological change, those two types of alliances do not seem to significantly affect one another. 
We discuss implications for theory and practice. 
 
Resumo 
Pesquisadores têm enfatizado a emergência de alianças entre compradores e supridores (verticais) e 
relações entre supridores (horizontais) como forme de promover aprendizado inter-organizacional e 
esforços cooperativos em sistemas de produção.  Existem controvérsias, no entanto, sobre como estas 
formas distintas de aliança interagem entre si.  Alguns propõem que relações horizontais reforçam o 
desenvolvimento de alianças verticais, ou vice-versa.  Por exemplo, o aprendizado inter-organizacional que 
ocorre em nível horizontal pode gerar externalidades positivas para a aliança vertical.  Outros propõem uma 
relação negativa: ao desenhar alianças verticais, por exemplo, compradores podem inibir a formação de 
alianças horizontais como forma de preservar o seu poder de barganha junto a supridores.  Nós testamos 
empiricamente estas visões contraditórias usando dados de questionários na indústria de auto-partes 
brasileira.  Como forma de reconciliar estas visões, nós propomos adicionalmente que a interação entre 
alianças verticais e horizontais será positiva ou negativa dependendo de uma contingência particular: o grau 
com que componentes são sujeitos a mudanças tecnológicas.  Nossos dados revelam que a existência de 
alianças verticais inibe o desenvolvimento de alianças horizontais, mas somente quando a mudança 
tecnológica é baixa.  Quanto componentes são sujeitos a alta mudança tecnológica, não parece haver 
interação significativa entre estes dois tipos de aliança.  Nós discutimos implicações para a teoria e prática. 
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Management scholars have devoted substantial attention to the study of buyer-
supplier alliances and how they impact the performance of firms vertically linked in a 
supply chain.  Thus, there is a great deal of evidence that through such vertical 
collaboration, buyers and suppliers are able to revamp production processes, reduce 
transaction costs and deliver better products to consumers (e.g. Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 
1997; Helper, 1991; Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003; Martin, Mitchell, & 
Swaminathan, 1995).  More recently, scholars have also underscored the importance of 
supplier-supplier alliances, i.e., horizontal ties among suppliers themselves.  According to 
this literature, suppliers are more and more engaging in value-enhancing collective efforts 
such as the exchange of best practices and joint product development (e.g. Brown & 
Hendry, 1998; Choi, Wu, Ellram, & Koka, 2002; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Stuart, 
Deckert, McCutcheon, & Kunst, 1998).   As a result, many inter-organizational networks 
have turned into “netchains”, that is, layers of horizontally-linked suppliers which are also 
associated with buyers through vertical collaborative ties (Lazzarini, Chaddad, & Cook, 
2001). 
Although scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of simultaneously 
assessing buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances, there is some controversy about 
how horizontal and vertical ties interact with one another and what consequences such an 
interaction brings.  Some consider the formation of supplier-supplier alliances as a 
beneficial organizational effort to foster effective buyer-supplier collaboration or vice-
versa.  The canonical example supporting this view is Toyota’s network of suppliers, 
which has been studied in great detail (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Nishiguchi & Beaudet, 
1998; Sako, 2004).  By stimulating the formation of supplier associations and voluntary   3
learning teams, Toyota has effectively promoted the diffusion of knowledge and best 
practices among suppliers.  The resulting improvements in processes and product 
configurations allow suppliers to be on the cutting edge in terms of production efficiency 
and innovation, which is in the best interest of Toyota.  Moreover, collaboration between 
Toyota and individual suppliers (e.g., through problem-solving teams) helps them 
develop competencies that can be disseminated in their horizontal network.  In this sense, 
supplier-supplier and buyer-supplier alliances reinforce one another. 
There is, however, an opposite possibility: supplier-supplier alliances may undermine 
the development of stable buyer-supplier alliances, or vice-versa. For example, instead of 
engaging in value-enhancing practices that would otherwise benefit the network as a 
whole, suppliers may form horizontal associations to balance their relative dependence 
and power in negotiations with buyers (Choi et al., 2002).  Observing that suppliers are 
forming alliances with each other for that purpose, buyers may attempt to constrain the 
formation of supplier-supplier alliances when vertical alliances are in place.  Reve (1992) 
finds empirical evidence that supplier-supplier and buyer-supplier alliances are 
negatively associated, and concludes that “rather than advocating the development of 
tightly structured alliances both horizontally and vertically, a trade-off between 
horizontal and vertical alliances is suggested” (p. 254).   If this negative effect occurs, we 
should expect either supplier-supplier or buyer-supplier collaborations, not both (as in 
Toyota’s case).  
These diverging views invite further work attempting to theoretically and empirically 
examine whether horizontal and vertical alliances reinforce or undermine one another.  
This is the goal of our paper.  We begin by providing theoretical underpinning to the   4
opposing patterns of interaction between supplier-supplier and buyer-supplier alliances, 
leading to the development of testable competing hypotheses.  We next attempt to 
reconcile these conflicting views by outlining a contingency that is likely to moderate the 
interaction between horizontal and vertical alliances: technological uncertainty (i.e., the 
extent to which products being exchanged exhibit constant change in specifications and 
new technologies).  In a nutshell, our argument is as follows: subject to high 
technological uncertainty, supplier-supplier alliances are likely to foster learning and 
innovation among suppliers, thus generating a positive spillover on the vertical exchange.  
When technological uncertainty is low, however, this effect should be minimal; any 
supplier-supplier association may be interpreted by buyers as a way to balance power in 
the network, thereby yielding a negative interaction between horizontal and vertical 
alliances.  We then test our hypotheses using survey-based data in the context of the auto-
parts industry in Brazil.  We conclude the paper by outlining implications for theory and 
practice, and suggesting some directions for further research. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Inter-organizational alliances are commonly conceptualized as collaborative, 
interdependent efforts between two or more firms (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Gulati, 
1998).  Moving beyond traditional arm’s-length transactions, alliances are characterized 
by the joint deployment of financial resources, knowledge, and infra-structure in such a 
way to increase the performance of products and processes in a particular exchange. As 
each individual firm associates itself with several other partners, these firms end up 
forming a network of alliances. Research has found that, through such alliance networks,   5
firms can benefit from knowledge generated by exchange partners (Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996; Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996) and promote relationship-specific investments without the need of costly 
vertical integration (Dyer, 1997; Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998; Jarillo, 1988).  Stimulated 
by the success of Japanese manufacturing companies, scholars have paid particular 
attention to the management of buyer-supplier or vertical alliances along the supply chain 
(Asanuma, 1989; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993; Helper & Sako, 1995).  For instance, buyers and 
suppliers may collaborate to reduce inventory and promote timely delivery (e.g., just-in-
time production).  Also, a buyer can engage a group of suppliers in the process of 
designing a new product or improving existing ones.  Such vertical alliances have been 
found to positively influence the performance of buyers and suppliers, in terms of both 
production efficiencies and innovation (Clark, 1989; Cusumano & Takeishi, 1991; 
Kotabe et al., 2003).    
Another parallel research stream has analyzed the emergence of supplier-supplier or 
horizontal alliances between peers.  The idea that firms in the same industry can create 
competitive advantage through mutual collaboration has been extensively discussed by 
the literature on regional clusters and industrial districts, which has explained the 
emergence of such patterns of collaboration as a way to economize on the provision of 
collective resources such as skilled labor, service providers, capital, infrastructure and 
other factors of production (e.g. Marshall, 1920; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Schmitz & Nadvi, 
1999).  Horizontal collaboration, however, may occur beyond the bounds of a particular 
location.  Suppliers may create broad, representative associations providing collective   6
services such as market information, lobbying with governments, and training (Altenburg 
& Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Harrison, 1992; Lane & Bachmann, 1996).   
Suppliers may also go beyond their simple participation in such associations to form 
narrower collaborative dealings and extensive horizontal supplier networks (Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000; Stuart et al., 1998)—which is the focus of our study.  Thus, suppliers can 
form committees and learning groups to exchange best practices and help one another to 
solve specific problems in their production processes   In addition, suppliers can jointly 
market products, develop new distribution channels, and share resources (such as 
contacts and infra-structure) to reach new markets.  Several authors have noted that 
alliances among competitors have become increasingly frequent in a broad range of 
industries (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Hamel, Doz, & 
Prahalad, 1989). 
More recently, scholars have tried to integrate these distinct research streams by 
offering a simultaneous assessment of buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances.  
Reve (1992) analyzes the emergence of horizontal and vertical relationships in 
distribution channels.  Brown & Hendry (1998) infuse elements of supply chain analysis 
to discuss forms of inter organizational learning in industrial districts, often said to 
exhibit collaborations of a horizontal kind.  Lazzarini, Chaddad & Cook (2001) discuss 
how supply chains have evolved into “netchains” comprised of horizontal networks of 
suppliers vertically linked with buyers.  They propose that the analysis of horizontal and 
vertical ties cannot be divorced, because the formation of supplier-supplier alliances may 
have consequences for the performance of buyer-supplier alliances, and vice-versa.   
Choi, Wu, Ellram & Koka (2002) offer a taxonomy of supplier-supplier alliances and   7
deliver several propositions regarding how such alliances may impact the performance of 
buyers and suppliers. 
Despite these recent advances in the literature, there is still some controversy 
regarding how buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances interact with each other.  In 
fact, distinct theoretical arguments accommodate opposing views.  On the one hand, the 
formation of supplier-supplier alliances may reinforce existing buyer-supplier alliances or 
prompt their formation, or vice-versa. In this case, we should expect the joint occurrence 
of buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances in a particular industry context.  On the 
other hand, the formation of vertical collaborations may constrain the development of 
horizontal ties among suppliers, or vice-versa.  If this effect holds, then we should expect 
less supplier-supplier alliances when buyer-supplier alliances deepen.  We discuss each 
possibility next.    
Buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances reinforcing one another 
  The view that buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances reinforce one another 
can be supported by at least two distinct theoretical arguments.  First, the inter-
organizational learning that occurs in buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances may 
be complementary.  Research in organizational learning has stressed the importance of 
acquiring knowledge and innovative ideas based on a network of relationships 
(Appleyard, 1996; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Powell, 1996).  By tapping into the external 
knowledge of its suppliers, a manufacturer can improve the performance of product 
components and develop new product configurations to customers.  To do so, however, 
both buyers and suppliers will need to jointly invest in knowledge generation and sharing 
through successive interactions (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Kale et al., 2000).  Therefore,   8
suppliers involved in collaborations with buyers will likely create themselves routines 
and know-how that can be useful to support other relationships, including relationships 
with peers.  Using Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) term, alliances with buyers will equip 
suppliers with an “absorptive capacity” through which they can value and understand 
external knowledge from horizontal partners.  Consequently, the formation of a vertical 
tie between a buyer and a supplier is likely to facilitate the formation of new 
collaborative ties between that supplier and its peers. 
  The argument also works in reverse: the formation of supplier-supplier alliances may 
increase the inter-organizational learning that occurs in buyer-supplier alliances.  Even in 
cases where suppliers are competitors, they will likely present differentiated knowledge 
based on their particular experiences and investments in product design and process 
improvements (Hamel et al., 1989; Schilling, 2000).  Buyers can therefore stimulate 
alliances between suppliers as a way to exploit the knowledge diversity that resides in the 
supplier network (Feldman & Audretsch, 1999; Kogut, 2000).  For instance, the 
performance of an alliance between a buyer and a supplier may increase if that supplier 
learns from another supplier how to manage process flows and promote continuous 
improvements in components.  As suppliers share knowledge about best practices and get 
involved in collaborations with themselves, they become more and more capable of 
forging valuable collaborative ties with buyers and meeting high standards of quality and 
innovation.  This argument has been used to explain why Toyota encourages suppliers to 
form extensive horizontal ties with each other (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Sako, 2004). 
  A second theoretical argument supporting a complementary interaction between 
vertical and horizontal alliances is based on the idea that supplier networks may increase   9
the commitment of the buyer to its vertical relationships, therefore favoring the formation 
of buyer-supplier alliances.  Fundamentally, this argument is based on Coleman’s (1988) 
view of network ties as conduits of information about the behavior of partners.  Because 
vertical alliances may require substantial relationship-specific investments, including the 
knowledge that will be generate through inter-organizational learning (Bureth, Wolff, & 
Zanfei, 1997), suppliers may be reluctant to engage in vertical collaborative agreements if 
they fear that their clients will adversely renegotiate terms of those agreements or switch 
to alternative suppliers (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998; Williamson, 1985).  Horizontal ties 
among suppliers may guarantee that any opportunistic behavior by the buyer will likely 
be disseminated in the network and trigger retaliation (e.g., suppliers may avoid 
transacting with or devoting high effort in exchanges with that buyer).  Anticipating this 
effect, buyers are likely to avoid reneging existing agreements or switching suppliers at 
will.   In contrast, in the absence of supplier-supplier alliances, any past opportunistic 
action by the buyer may remain undetected (except by the offended supplier).  Also using 
Toyota’s production network as an example, Kreps (2004: 605-608) employs this logic to 
explain why buyers may find it advantageous to stimulate the formation of supplier-
supplier alliances as a way to develop and commit to a cooperative buyer-supplier 
alliance.    
Collectively, these distinct theoretical arguments lead to: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between vertical (buyer-supplier) and 
horizontal (supplier-supplier) alliances: if a supplier develops a vertical alliance 
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Buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances undermining one another 
Essentially, the arguments above consider that buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier 
alliances will be created for efficiency purposes—either to increase inter-organizational 
learning, or to create incentives for cooperation in the exchange.  Rather than a means to 
increase efficiency in the system, however, vertical and horizontal collaborations may be 
structured to influence the position of buyers and suppliers in their negotiations.  
Resource dependence theory (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social 
exchange theory (e.g. Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962) provide underpinning for this view, 
given their emphasis on how actors in an exchange balance their dependence and power.  
Such considerations support the prediction that the formation of buyer-supplier alliances 
will constrain the formation of supplier-supplier alliances, or vice-versa, for two reasons.   
First, the formation of vertical alliances may reduce suppliers’ autonomy to engage 
in other types of alliances.  As noted before, most learning and performance-enhancing 
investments that occur in inter-organizational alliances tend to be relationship-specific.  
Although those specific assets have transactional value (Dyer, 1997; Madhok & Tallman, 
1998), by definition they are less valuable when applied to alternative uses or users 
(Williamson, 1985).  Thus, if a supplier develops a vertical alliance to engage in product 
design, the knowledge generated in the exchange may be mostly applicable to the buyer 
with whom the supplier is collaborating, thereby constraining the development of other 
ties (Blau, 1964; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Oliver, 1991)—including ties of a horizontal kind.  
Conversely, the formation of supplier-supplier alliances may undermine the formation of 
vertical collaborations.  If suppliers anticipate that the formation of vertical alliances will 
increase their dependence on a particular buyer (Laamanen, 2005; Singh & Mitchell,   11
1996), they may reduce their resource commitments to that particular buyer and, instead, 
focus on horizontal collaborations which may allow them to apply the resulting know-
how to a broader range of clients.  Thus, Stuart et al. (1998: 91) suggest that horizontal 
networks may focus on “holistic learning and organizational advancement, not 
necessarily tied to the products sold to a particular buyer.” 
A second and related argument suggests that supplier-supplier alliances may be 
deliberately formed to increase suppliers’ bargaining power relative to buyers.  For 
instance, suppliers engaged in horizontal alliances may jointly negotiate the terms of 
exchanges with common buyers (such as prices or exclusivity clauses). Consequently, 
when crafting their vertical alliances, buyers may attempt to inhibit the development of 
horizontal alliances as a way to avoid supplier collusion (Choi et al., 2002).  This logic 
implies that the presence of buyer-supplier alliances will inhibit the emergence of 
suppliers-supplier alliances.  It is also possible, however, that the absence of 
collaborative vertical alliances will prompt the emergence of supplier-supplier alliances.  
Lacking a collaborative orientation, buyer-suppliers negotiations will tend to be strictly 
price-driven and, to a large extent, impersonal (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Macneil, 
1978).  This environment should prompt suppliers to form alliances among themselves to 
create, using Galbraith’s (1956) terminology, countervailing power in their vertical 
negotiations.  By doing so, suppliers should reduce their direct competition and pose 
constraints on buyers’ ability to benefit from multiple, unarticulated actors (Burt, 1992; 
Emerson, 1962).   As proposed by Reve (1992: 238), “organizations facing external 
constraints in one direction (e.g., vis-à-vis their customers) may strengthen their external   12
ties in other directions (e.g., vis-à-vis their competitors) with the objective of influencing 
the first sector as well.”   
These arguments lead to our second hypothesis, which competes with the first 
hypothesis outlined before:   
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative association between vertical (buyer-supplier) and 
horizontal (supplier-supplier) alliances: if a supplier develops a vertical alliance 
with a buyer, it will less likely develop a horizontal alliance with another supplier, or 
vice-versa. 
 
The contingent effect of technological uncertainty 
  The two competing views outlined before identify a tradeoff for the establishment of 
horizontal and vertical alliances.  From the point of the view of buyers, stimulating its 
supplier partners to form horizontal alliances is likely to augment inter-organizational 
learning and promote cooperation; but it is also likely to reduce buyers’ bargaining 
position in the vertical tie.  From the point of view of suppliers, crafting collaborative 
vertical alliances is likely to allow them to develop know-how that can be applied to 
other exchanges; but it is also likely to mandate a substantial commitment of specific 
resources, possibly constraining the formation of alternative ties.  Therefore, the interplay 
between buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances may be negative or positive 
depending on the relative magnitude of those opposing effects.  This discussion invites 
the use of some contingency that might influence the relative benefits and costs of 
forming horizontal alliances when vertical alliances are in place, or vice-versa (Choi et 
al., 2002). 
  We adopt an environmental variable that has been widely adopted in contingency-
based theory (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 1967) and in the literature on inter-
organizational alliances (Afuah, 2000; Harrigan, 1988; Poppo & Zenger, 2002):   13
technological uncertainty.  Supply components which display constant change in 
specifications and new technological breakthroughs will create an environment where 
technological uncertainty is at a high degree.  For instance, in the auto industry, fuel 
injection systems are normally considered as supplies involving constant innovations, 
while clutches constitute an example of standardized product with mature, well-known 
technology (Swaminathan, Hoetker, & Mitchell, 2002).  Thus, depending on the type of 
products and components being exchanged, a network will exhibit heterogeneity in terms 
of the technological uncertainty that surrounds transacting partners.  And this 
heterogeneity will likely moderate the interplay between horizontal and vertical alliances. 
  When technological uncertainty is high, the need for inter-organizational learning at 
the supplier level will escalate.  Exchange of best practices and even joint development of 
technologies through supplier-supplier alliances will be crucial to keep suppliers on the 
cutting edge and generate valuable product or process innovations (Stuart et al., 1998).   
To accomplish innovations that are useful for buyers, suppliers will also likely need to 
promote relationship-specific investments, which will demand high commitment levels in 
the vertical exchange.  As discussed before, horizontal alliances among suppliers should 
increase their confidence that buyers will not renege on existing agreements.  Thus, from 
the point of the view of buyers, the positive effect of supplier-supplier alliances will 
likely outweigh the negative effect associated with increased supplier power when 
technological uncertainty is high.  This effect should also hold in from the point of view 
of suppliers: vertical collaborations with buyers will improve their ability to develop 
valuable, innovative alliances elsewhere.  In contrast, when technological uncertainty is 
low, there should be no need for inter-organizational learning and accompanying   14
investments in relationship-specific assets.   Buyers may be reluctant to accept favorably 
the formation of supplier-supplier alliances because they may be interpreted as a way to 
increase supplier bargaining power without sizable compensating benefits in terms of 
learning or cooperation.   Consequently, low technological uncertainty should lead to a 
negative effect of supplier-supplier alliances on buyer-supplier alliances (or vice-versa).  
In other words: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: When technological uncertainty is high, there is a positive 
association between vertical (buyer-supplier) and horizontal (supplier-supplier) 
alliances. 
  
Hypothesis 3b: When technological uncertainty is low, there is a negative 
association between vertical (buyer-supplier) and horizontal (supplier-supplier) 
alliances. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
We tested our hypotheses by surveying suppliers of automobile parts in Brazil.  The 
auto industry in Brazil is an appropriate empirical setting for our study. This industry has 
a history of alliances not only between suppliers and automobile manufacturers, but also 
among suppliers themselves (Addis, 1999).  We focused our survey instrument on 
suppliers (instead of manufacturers) because their population is much larger than the 
population of manufacturers.  Moreover, they are well-organized through a business 
association (Sindipeças, Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de Componentes para Veículos 
Automotores), whose members contribute with over 90% of revenues of the parts sector 
in Brazil.  Sindipeças granted us access to its directory of members and helped us in the 
procedures to implement the survey. 
Research design and data collection 
Our survey data collection processes mostly followed Dillman’s (2000) procedures. 
We initially developed a questionnaire by identifying construct items used in previous   15
studies. We also obtained the help of other academics and managers to develop items 
where the literature was silent, to refine survey wording, and to check the overall validity 
of questions vis-à-vis the industry environment. We compiled a mailing list of 
approximately 450 firms, using a list of Sindipeças members. As noted above, the 
Sindipeças’ member directory is representative of the population as a whole, as it covers 
over 90% of the parts made in Brazil. Through Sindipeças, we identified the key 
respondents—either general or division manager. These managers are most 
knowledgeable about their firm’s relationships with other suppliers and with auto-
manufacturers, as well as about company-specific information.  We then administered the 
questionnaires from July 2004 to March 2005.  Our response rate was just above 40% 
(184 responses)—though, because of missing values, a total of 105 observations were 
effectively used in our regressions.  We assessed non-respondent bias by comparing early 
with late respondents through a t-test (see e.g. Armstrong & Overton, 1977). We found 
no significant differences. 
In the questionnaire, we asked respondents about the prior three years of their firm’s 
activities to avoid biased responses due to specific aberrant experiences. In the survey, 
we asked respondents to assess vertical and horizontal alliances.  In the case of vertical 
alliances, we asked respondents to focus on “a customer that the respondent was most 
knowledgeable about.”  We also asked questions related to each firm’s relationship with 
another supplier.  Respondents were asked to select a company that supplies a similar or 
complementary product to the buyer (customer) that the respondent previously identified.  
To facilitate responses, our questionnaire focused on a particular product that represented 
most of the firm’s revenues. 
Our sample includes both large and small firms, as well as domestic and multinational 
ones.  Nearly half (45%) of the firms surveyed were subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals. Moreover, our sample appears to exhibit a diversity of firms in terms of 
size.  Measured by sales volume in millions of dollars, 7% of them had sales that were   16
less than US$2.5 million, 25% had sales between $2.5 million and $10 million, 36% had 
sales between $10 million and $40 million, 22% had sales between $40 million and $200 
million, 6% had sales between $200 million and $400 million, and 8% had sales of more 
than $400 million.  
Variables 
We describe below four sets of variables: alliance-based variables (used to measure 
the extent of vertical and horizontal alliance activity), determinants of vertical alliances, 
determinants of horizontal alliances, and common variables influencing both alliances 
(including our measure of technological uncertainty and control variables).  Variables 
based on measurement scales are described in Table 1. All the measurement instruments 
that used multi-item scales followed a 5-point Likert scale in which “1” represented “low 
degree” and “5” represented “high degree”.  Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of 
our variables. 
 [Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Alliance-based variables 
We measured alliances through the actions of parties in fostering joint activities 
(Heide & Miner, 1992; Lusch & Brown, 1996). Alliance-based variables are a 
multidimensional construct, where each variable was measured using 7 items involving a 
5-point Likert scale.  Specifically, we gauged the extent to which the respondent has 
engaged in joint activities with its selected customer (buyer) and peer (another supplier of 
the selected customer).  We asked the respondent to report whether the alliances involved 
any form of coordinated action in areas such as: marketing and exports related activities; 
new product and process development; sharing of equipment and other resources; joint 
purchase of inputs; and joint representation at governmental agencies.  We thus created 
the variables Buyer-supplier alliance and Supplier-supplier alliances as the unweighted 
average of the items (Cronbach alphas, respectively, equal to 0.70 and 0.81).  Therefore,   17
our alliance-based variables measure the intensity of collaboration among parties in their 
vertical or horizontal exchange.  
Variables influencing the emergence of buyer-supplier alliances 
Relational norms in the vertical exchange.  This variable measures the extent of 
information sharing and the behavioral norms associated with the buyer-supplier alliance 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990). In general, we tried to measure respondents’ perception of 
whether negotiations are fair and the resulting commitments will be sustained, as well as 
whether there is trust and collaborative orientation among parties.  As widely discussed in 
the literature, relational norms support the emergence and stability of inter-organizational 
alliances because they allow parties to economize on the costs of contracting and 
mutually adapt to changing circumstances (Dwyer et al., 1987; Dyer, 1997).  Since those 
relational norms are likely developed trough repeated interaction in past transactions 
(Gulati, 1995; Poppo, 1995), they are commonly considered as determinants of inter-
organizational collaborations.  The score of the perceptions about relational norms was 
computed as the unweighted average of the measurement items (Cronbach alpha = 0.82). 
Specific investments.  This variable measures the extent to which an investment was 
made specifically for the customer (buyer) indicated by the respondent in the last 5 years. 
The investments could be in terms of production processes, sales, procurement or 
logistics, research and development, and physical assets (e.g., hardware and industrial 
facilities).  Past specific investments of that sort can influence the emergence and stability 
of alliances because they signal commitment to the exchange (Anderson & Weitz, 1992) 
and support joint action (Dyer, 1997).  For instance, if the supplier invests in facilities 
close to its client, inter-partner exchange of knowledge will be largely facilitated.  The 
score of the perceptions about specific investments in the vertical exchange was 
calculated as the unweighted average of the items indicating possible investments that 
could be accomplished (Crobnach alpha = 0.73). 
Variables influencing the emergence of supplier-supplier alliances   18
Relational norms in the horizontal exchange.  This variable was measured in the 
exact same way as the variable Relational norms in the vertical exchange.  Respondents 
were asked to refer to another supplier who transacts with the selected customer 
(Cronbach alpha = 0.95).  As in the case of vertical alliances, we expect that relational 
norms among suppliers facilitate the formation of horizontal alliances. 
Participation in supplier association.  Several authors have noted that, through their 
participation in business associations, firms can forge specific contacts and alliances 
(Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Rosenkopf, Metiu, & George, 2001).  Thus, the effective 
involvement of suppliers in their main business association (Sindipeças) could be an 
antecedent of horizontal ties. Sindipeças was singled out for special focus because both 
the literature and preliminary work on the survey confirmed that this organization is the 
dominant institution for parts firms (e.g. Addis, 1999).  Because we sent questionnaires to 
all Sindipeças’ members, we needed to measure not only whether suppliers were 
involved in their association, but also the intensity of their involvement.  In this sense, we 
tried to gauge respondents’ assessments of the effectiveness of Sindipeças in supporting 
their activities as a way to assess the extent to which they were engaged in the 
association.  We thus crafted a multi-dimensional construct, where respondents indicated 
in a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which the agreed that Sindipeças was effective to 
organize and supply technical training, develop economic/technical studies, hold social 
events to gather members, support collective negotiations with the government, and so 
forth. The score of the perceptions about the association was calculated as the unweighted 
average of the items (Cronbach alpha = 0.81) 
Common variables influencing the formation of both vertical and horizontal alliances 
Technological uncertainty.  As a result of volatile market demand and technological 
breakthroughs, some components are likely to exhibit changing specifications and 
embodied technologies.  An environment with high technological uncertainty should not 
only favor the formation of alliances in general (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000),   19
but also, as discussed before, moderate the interplay between horizontal and vertical 
alliances.  We thus asked respondents to assess, through a Likert scale, whether their 
main product has been subject to constant technological change and variations in 
customers’ needs.  The score of the perceptions about technological uncertainty was 
calculated as the unweighted average of the items (Cronbach alpha = 0.76). 
R&D.   We asked in the questionnaire the percentage of annual revenues that the 
company usually spends in R&D.   Firms with large investments in R&D should have 
greater capacity and/or propensity to build alliances to improve processes and products, 
both horizontally and vertically (Powell et al., 1996).   
Multinational.  This dummy variable is coded 1 if the supplier is foreign-controlled, 
and 0 otherwise.  One might suggest that foreign-owned companies are more likely to 
form alliances, given their global influence and reach. 
 Firm age.  We asked respondents to indicate the number of years their companies 
have been working in the auto-part sector.  Older firms may be more knowledgeable of 
other firms in the industry, thus favoring the formation of alliances. 
Valued-added.  We asked respondents to report the 3-year average yearly revenues of 
their firm, and then divided this number by the total number of employees to compute the 
variable Value-added.  This variable intends to control for the type of products 
manufactured by the supplier.  For instance, high-tech firms that do not employ intensive 
labor in the production processes may have superior capabilities to form alliances in 
general. 
Number of employees (in thousands).  Larger firms may possess a superior pool of 
resources and scale necessary to invest in cooperative efforts with other suppliers and 
customers.  Thus, we asked respondents to indicate the current total number of employees 
in their company as a measure of supplier size. 
Method   20
A straightforward way to test our hypotheses would be to run simple regressions 
where Buyer-supplier alliance is a dependent variable and Supplier-supplier alliance is 
an independent variable, and then vice-versa.  A critical problem with this approach is 
that vertical and horizontal alliances are likely endogenously determined, based on a host 
of unobserved factors.  For instance, a firm may have distinctive capabilities to form and 
manage alliances in general, thus increasing its propensity to form both vertical and 
horizontal alliances for a reason that is distinct from the arguments supporting Hypothesis 
1.  Alternatively, the interaction between buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances 
may be negative not due to the effect of one type of alliance on the other per se, as 
proposed by Hypothesis 2, but due to firms’ own limitations in physical, financial or 
human resources impeding the simultaneous management of a portfolio of vertical and 
horizontal alliances.  Failing to control for this joint determination should lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimates.  Indeed, a Wu-Hausman test applied to our data revealed the 
existence of simultaneity involving vertical and horizontal alliances. 
We thus employ the three-stage least squares method (e.g. Greene, 2000; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002) to correct for simultaneity by jointly estimating two regressions: one 
where Buyer-supplier alliance is the dependent variable and Supplier-supplier alliance is 
an independent variable, and another where these variables switch their position.   
Support for Hypothesis 1 can be found either if the coefficient of Supplier-supplier 
alliance is significantly positive in the regression where Buyer-supplier alliance is in the 
left-hand side, or if the coefficient of Buyer-supplier alliance is significantly positive in 
the regression where Supplier-supplier alliance is the dependent variable.  Hypothesis 2 
is supported if one of the alliance-based variables exhibits a significantly negative 
coefficient.  To identify the system of equations, when Buyer-supplier alliance is in the 
left-hand side we use as instruments the variables influencing the formation of vertical 
alliances, discussed before, and exclude them in the other regression.   We do the same in 
the regression where Supplier-supplier alliance is in the left-hand side, using as   21
instruments the variables influencing horizontal alliances.  In both equations, we add the 
common variables discussed before.   
The three-stage least squares method is particularly attractive because the coefficients 
of two regressions are jointly estimated considering a possible correlation between the 
error terms in each equation.  This feature tends to increase the efficiency of parameter 
estimates.  Another attractive feature of the method is that it allows us not only to observe 
whether buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances display a positive or negative 
interaction, but also the direction of their association (e.g., whether vertical alliances 
affect horizontal alliances, or vice-versa). 
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, in turn, we need to assess whether the coefficients of 
Buyer-supplier alliance and Supplier-supplier alliance vary depending on the level of the 
variable Technological uncertainty.  A usual way to observe this effect is to create 
multiplicative terms involving the contingency variable and the main variables of interest.  
The problem of using this approach in our context is that the three-stage least squares 
method assumes linearity of the endogenous variables, therefore failing to accommodate 
interactions.  To overcome this limitation, we adopt a simple approach of splitting the 
data into two sub-samples: one in which Technological uncertainty is above or equal to 
its mean, and another in which this variable is below its mean.  This procedure allows us 
to examine how the coefficients of the alliance-based variables change according to two 
conditions: high and low technological uncertainty.  Hypothesis 3a and 3b are supported, 
respectively, if the coefficients of the alliance-based variables are positive in the sub-
sample where technological uncertainty is perceived to be high, and negative in the sub-
sample where technological uncertainty is perceived to be low. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 presents the results of the three-stage least squares estimation.  Models (1a) 
and (1b) are jointly estimated based on the whole sample of suppliers, and hence are used   22
to test the competing hypotheses 1 and 2.   Although the coefficient of Supplier-supplier 
alliance in the regression using Buyer-supplier alliance as a dependent variable is 
insignificant, the coefficient of Buyer-supplier alliance in the regression where Supplier-
supplier alliance is in the right-hand side is significant (p < 0.05) and indicates a negative 
effect of the vertical alliance on the horizontal alliance. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported 
and Hypothesis 1 is not supported: on average, buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier 
alliances appear to display a negative interaction.  Furthermore, the effect is 
unidirectional: vertical alliances constrain horizontal ones, but not conversely. When 
forming vertical alliances, suppliers commit specific resources to their joint collaboration 
with buyers and, doing so, they apparently reduce their autonomy to form other ties 
(including ties with peers). Alternatively, buyers may deliberately influence their vertical 
partners not to form a horizontal tie in order to avoid a loss in bargaining power. These 
two explanations are consistent with the results presented in models (1a) and (1b). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b imply differential effects of buyer-supplier on supplier 
alliances (or vice-versa) depending on the level of technological uncertainty involving 
supply components.  As discussed before, the test of two differential effects is performed 
by splitting the sample into two conditions: where Technological uncertainty is below its 
mean (models (2a) and (2b)), and where it is above its mean (models (3a) and (3b)).  
Supporting Hypothesis 3b, we find a significantly negative effect of Buyer-supplier 
alliance on Supplier-supplier alliance (p < 0.01, model (2b)) when technological 
uncertainty is low, in a magnitude that is apparently larger than in the regression 
involving the whole sample.  This effect, however, is insignificant in the sub-sample 
where technological uncertainty is high (model (3b)).  Thus, Hypothesis 3a is not 
supported: we do not find any positive interaction between horizontal and vertical 
alliances when components are subject to high technological change.  As before, we find   23
no significant result involving the effect of Supplier-supplier alliance on Buyer-supplier 
alliance.   
Together, these results provide mixed support for our contingency-based prediction 
on the interplay between buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances.  On the one hand, 
the negative interaction among those two types of alliances is found only when 
technological uncertainty is low, which supports our argument that the efficiency-based 
benefits of supplier-supplier alliances should decline when the need for supplier inter-
organizational learning is scant.  In this condition, when forming vertical alliances with 
suppliers, buyers will likely view the formation of horizontal alliances in a negative way.  
On the other hand, we do not find a positive interaction between horizontal and vertical 
alliances when technological uncertainty is high.  Indeed, we find no significant 
interaction in this condition whatsoever.  Apparently, when technological uncertainty is 
high, vertical and horizontal alliances can be formed without any direct consequence for 
each other.  Because we fail to find any significant and positive interaction between 
buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances when technological uncertainty is high, the 
discriminating effect of this contingency is weaker than we initially hypothesized.   
Some comments about the instrumental and control variables are in order.   As 
expected, Relational norms in the exchange is always strongly significant and positively 
influences the emergence of both buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances (p < 
0.01), thus confirming that trust and a general propensity to collaborate support deeper 
inter-organizational ties, either vertical or horizontal.   This effect remains significant 
even in the split-sample regressions. 
Also as expected, Specific investments accomplished by suppliers to support their 
exchanges with buyers are positively correlated with stronger vertical collaborations.   
Interestingly, the effect of Specific investments varies according to the different sub-
samples.  This variable displays a strongly significant and positive coefficient when 
technological uncertainty is high (p < 0.01); however, it is insignificant when   24
technological uncertainty is low.  A possible explanation is that conditions involving high 
technological uncertainty mandate a broader range of specific investments to support 
inter-organizational learning, which is by itself specific to the exchange.  For instance, 
suppliers may need to invest in facilities close to the buyer to support the joint design of 
products.  In contrast, when technological uncertainty is low, no profound inter-
organizational learning needs to occur, thereby reducing the need of other accompanying 
investments.   
The last instrumental variable, Participation in supplier association, exhibits mixed 
results.  In the whole sample, the significantly positive coefficient of that variable 
indicates that Brazilian auto-parts suppliers’ involvement in their supplier association 
(Sindipeças) positively influences the formation of horizontal ties (p < 0.05).  This result 
confirms that business associations serve not only as a way to supply collective resources, 
but also as a networking mechanism through which members can forge specific alliances 
with one another.  Participation, however, becomes insignificant in the split-sample 
regressions.  Given that this variable is significantly positive in the whole sample, its lack 
of significance in the sub-samples may be a result of the reduced degrees of freedom in 
models (2) and (3). 
As a final note, it is worth observing that common variables for the two regressions 
are in general insignificant, indicating that most explanatory power of the models is 
coming from the hypothesized and instrumental variables.  In particular, although 
Technological uncertainty appears to influence the effect of buyer-supplier on supplier-
alliance alliances, it has no direct effect on the formation of those alliances in general. 
Strong effects are found only with Firm age in model (2a) (indicating that older suppliers 
are more likely to form vertical alliances when technological uncertainty is low) and 
Multinational in model (3b) (indicating that foreign-owned suppliers are more likely to 
develop horizontal collaborations when technological uncertainty is high). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our paper contributes to the literature by theoretically and empirically examining the 
interplay between buyer-supplier (vertical) and supplier-supplier (horizontal) alliances in 
production systems.  Although scholars have increasingly stressed the importance of the 
simultaneous assessment of vertical and horizontal alliances, distinct theoretical 
arguments have led to different predictions regarding the nature of their interaction.  In 
this paper, we not only outline those distinct arguments, but also provide an attempt at 
reconciliation.  Basically, we propose that the interaction between buyer-supplier and 
supplier-supplier alliances will be positive or negative depending on a particular 
contingency: the extent to which supply components are subject to uncertain 
technological change.   Our data reveal that vertical alliances negatively affect the 
development of horizontal alliances, but only when technological uncertainty is relatively 
low.  When components are subject to higher technological change, those two types of 
alliances do not appear to significantly affect one another. 
Although aligned with the results reported in Reve (1992), the absence of a positive 
effect of supplier-supplier on buyer-supplier alliances (and vice-versa) in our data is 
inconsistent with existing work suggesting that horizontal alliances complement vertical 
forms of collaboration in supply chains from an inter-organizational learning perspective 
(e.g. Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Stuart et al., 1998).  On the contrary, our results indicate 
that, through the development of ties in one dimension, actors apparently want to 
maintain their autonomy in the other dimension—especially when supply components are 
not subject to high technological change.  Thus, in general, deep horizontal and vertical 
alliances should not be frequently observed coexisting in inter-organizational networks.  
Given the growing interest in Japanese production systems emphasizing a mix of 
horizontal and vertical alliances, the practical relevance of our results becomes salient.  
Our study, however, presents several limitations.  Our database is focused on a single 
industry and a single country, therefore lacking heterogeneity in terms of technology and   26
institutional features.  For instance, it may be the case that horizontal and vertical 
alliances coexist to a higher degree in Japan because of the greater role of networks as 
conduits of information about partners’ behavior in that country (e.g. Hagen & Choe, 
1998).  In contrast, although inter-organizational networks have been commonly 
observed in the Brazilian auto industry, their social role appears to have declined over the 
years, in part due to increasing entry of foreign firms replacing existing, well-connected 
actors (Addis, 1999).  Future research should therefore attempt to evaluate the interplay 
between horizontal and vertical alliances in a broader range of industries and institutional 
contexts. 
A related limitation of our study refers to the way we treat technological uncertainty.  
Since we are focusing on a single industry and a single country, the only feature that 
guarantees variation with respect to this variable in our study is the apparent 
heterogeneity of supply components in the sample.  Other industries, however, may 
exhibit even greater variation in technological uncertainty.  Thus, the products in our 
sample may not have a rate of technological change that is high enough to augment the 
benefits of inter-organizational learning and lead to a positive interaction between 
vertical and horizontal alliances.  A possible way to increase the heterogeneity with 
respect to this contingency in future work is to collect data from different industries 
showing polar levels of perceived uncertainty (e.g. Rowley et al., 2000).   
Finally, we focus on the interplay between buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier 
alliances without any consideration about the impact of those alliances on the 
performance of buyers and suppliers.  Yet, performance considerations are critical to 
inform managers about the possible costs and benefits to form vertical and horizontal 
alliances.  Thus, in conditions where those alliances are negatively related, suppliers must 
ascertain whether they should invest in vertical alliances with buyers (which will likely 
constrain the development of horizontal ties) or invest in horizontal alliances with peers 
(thus refraining from forming deep vertical ties).  This choice will depend on the relative   27
contributions of buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier alliances for the economic and 
operational performance of firms.  Future research examining how horizontal and vertical 
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Table 1.  Description of variables involving measurement scales 
 
Buyer-supplier alliance (α = 0.70) and Supplier-supplier alliance (α = 0.81)* 
To what extent your company is developing the activities (listed below) together with your selected 
supplier/customer: 
1.  Marketing and export-related activities 
2.  New product and process development 
3.  Sharing of equipment and other production machinery  
4.  Joint purchases 
5.  Joint negotiations with governmental agencies  
6.  Sharing of investments, responsibilities and efforts 
7.  Sharing the burden and the outcomes of joint initiatives 
 
Relational norms in the vertical exchange (α = 0.82) and in the horizontal exchange (α = 0.95)* 
To what extent your relationship with your selected supplier/customer is characterized by the following 
elements: 
1.  Fluid exchange of information 
2.  Exchange of information about production costs 
3.  Exchange of information about plans, programs and schedules 
4.  Transparent negotiations 
5.  Helping each other in implementing programs of inventory management (e.g. just-in-time) 
6.  Problem-solving approach rather than mutual conflict 
7.  Mutual trust and commitment 
8.  Flexibility to make adjustments when difficult situations unfold 
 
Participation in supplier associations (α = 0.81) 
The degree to which your company uses specialized support from the business association (Sindipeças) for: 
1.  Technical training   
2.  Technical and economic information 
3.  Social events 
4.  Political lobbying for the industry as a whole 
5.  Political lobbying for your company or group of companies 
6.  Support for collective actions among associates (e.g. collective procurement, marketing) 
7.  Advising and monitoring collective norms and standards (e.g. quality)   
 
Specific investments in the vertical exchange (α = 0.73) 
To what extent your company invested in the following routines and specific assets to deal with your customer:
1.  Research and development, product design and facilities for R&D 
2.  Production process, machinery and equipment 
3.  Sales and procurement systems, logistics and inventory management 
4.  New production plants and warehouses 
5.  Computer hardware and software  
 
Technological uncertainty (α = 0.81) 
To what extent your business is characterized by: 
1.  Frequent introduction of new products or innovations in the existing products 
2.  Constant need to fulfill the technological needs of customers 
3.  Frequent variation in demanded over the years 
4.  Frequent technological change 
 
* There were two different blocks of questions in the questionnaire: one for the supplier-supplier alliance, and 
another for the buyer-supplier alliance.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12 
1.Buyer-supplier alliance  1.00              
2.Supplier-supplier alliance  -0.13  1.00             
3.Relational norms (vertical)  0.54  -0.15  1.00            
4.Specific investments  0.16  0.04  0.06  1.00           
5.Relational norms (horizontal)  -0.11  0.75  -0.11  0.07  1.00          
6.Participation in supplier association  0.17  0.15  0.16  -0.04  0.14  1.00         
7.Technological uncertainty  0.10  -0.05 0.17 0.21  -0.02 0.05 1.00           
8.R&D  -0.16 0.08  -0.20 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.12 1.00         
9.Multinational  0.06 0.03  -0.17  -0.06  -0.06  -0.01  -0.17 0.01 1.00       
10.Firm age  -0.02 0.06  -0.12  -0.05 0.06  -0.09  -0.06 0.10 0.05  1.00     
11.Value-added  -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06  0.10  0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02  -0.05  1.00   
12.Number of employees  0.25  -0.08 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.01  -0.03 0.06  0.00  -0.08 1.00 
Mean  2.25 1.42 3.28 3.54 1.67 3.06 3.10 4.22 0.44 30.71 0.58 0.74 
Std.  Dev.  0.61 0.64 0.77 0.78 0.98 0.71 0.80 3.43 0.50 17.58 1.64 1.48 
N = 105 
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Table 3. Determinants of buyer-supplier (vertical) and supplier-supplier (horizontal) alliances: three-stage least squares estimation 
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Supplier-supplier alliance  -0.050
(0.098)
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(0.109)
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(0.077)
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Specific investments  0.123
(0.061)


















































































































N  105  105 52 52 53  53 
R
2  0.425 0.611 0.361 0.671 0.573  0.605 
χ
2  77.52** 168.26**  31.78** 113.51**  76.08**  81.93** 
** p < .01  * p < .05  † p < .10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects, including instruments).  The table shows parameter estimates and standard 
errors in parenthesis.  Models (2) and (3) involve sub-samples dichotomized based on the mean value of the variable Technological uncertainty. 
 